Spring Break
11/3 Column: Finding American Interests in Somalia
Bejamin Farkas '10
Issue date: 11/3/08 Section: Opinion
In fall 1993, after 18 American troops were killed in an ambush in Mogadishu, the voices questioning whether involvement in Somalia was in America's interest grew in strength and number.
Even some defenders of American involvement such as Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey (writing in the New York Times on Oct. 7) admitted that "Somalia isn't a security concern." They had no way of knowing that pirates 15 years later would prove them wrong.
Strangely enough, the Somali pirates' highest profile seizure - a ship carrying Russian tanks to Kenya - seems to have had positive effects in the sense that it exposed an illegal arms deal between Kenya and south Sudan. However, the pirates themselves are, to say the least, a security concern. In 2008 alone, they have taken hostage dozens of ships, most recently a tanker, on an important shipping lane connecting the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, demanding millions in ransoms.
Somalia today poses this security concern to the US and the world precisely because 15 years ago the international community did not manage to halt Somalia's descent into complete anarchy. Virtually any degree of actual government in Somalia would have prevented the formation of pirate gangs. The pirates are manifestations of the real security concern in Somalia: chaos.
Somalia shows that chaos, even in seemingly remote places, leads to significant global threats. Preventing chaos, then, is a matter of basic national interest to the United States. It is important to prevent chaos, rather than dealing with its symptoms, because preventing
it is much easier than ending it once it has come about. Political solutions require the presence of a few powerful factions with whom dialogue is meaningful. Given that Somalia is now governed by a mosaic of clan-based groups and Islamic radicals, it is little surprise that the process of creating a "transitional government" through agreements among various groups was so tortuous, and that this government has virtually no power. Creating a stable government would have been easier (though still very difficult) in the early 1990s when the country was still in civil war and there were leaders (albeit unsavory ones) worth talking to.
Preventing chaos in Somalia may have already been impossible by 1993. But this only shows that consistent engagement with failing states around the world is necessary to prevent outright state failure and the security concerns that follow upon it.
Even some defenders of American involvement such as Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey (writing in the New York Times on Oct. 7) admitted that "Somalia isn't a security concern." They had no way of knowing that pirates 15 years later would prove them wrong.
Strangely enough, the Somali pirates' highest profile seizure - a ship carrying Russian tanks to Kenya - seems to have had positive effects in the sense that it exposed an illegal arms deal between Kenya and south Sudan. However, the pirates themselves are, to say the least, a security concern. In 2008 alone, they have taken hostage dozens of ships, most recently a tanker, on an important shipping lane connecting the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, demanding millions in ransoms.
Somalia today poses this security concern to the US and the world precisely because 15 years ago the international community did not manage to halt Somalia's descent into complete anarchy. Virtually any degree of actual government in Somalia would have prevented the formation of pirate gangs. The pirates are manifestations of the real security concern in Somalia: chaos.
Somalia shows that chaos, even in seemingly remote places, leads to significant global threats. Preventing chaos, then, is a matter of basic national interest to the United States. It is important to prevent chaos, rather than dealing with its symptoms, because preventing
it is much easier than ending it once it has come about. Political solutions require the presence of a few powerful factions with whom dialogue is meaningful. Given that Somalia is now governed by a mosaic of clan-based groups and Islamic radicals, it is little surprise that the process of creating a "transitional government" through agreements among various groups was so tortuous, and that this government has virtually no power. Creating a stable government would have been easier (though still very difficult) in the early 1990s when the country was still in civil war and there were leaders (albeit unsavory ones) worth talking to.
Preventing chaos in Somalia may have already been impossible by 1993. But this only shows that consistent engagement with failing states around the world is necessary to prevent outright state failure and the security concerns that follow upon it.
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